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Governance	as	an	Emergent	Compromise:	Modernization	and	Flexibility	in	
the	Pakistani	Electrical	Power	Sector	
	
Ijlal	Naqvi	
Assistant	Professor	of	Sociology 
School	of	Social	Sciences,	Singapore	Management	University 
		
	
Abstract:	Developing	countries	are	often	characterized	by	a	mix	of	bad	governance	and	
initiatives	seeking	to	achieve	development	through	programs	of	accelerated	
modernization.	When	cracks	in	the	modernization	process	appear,	these	create	
opportunities	for	informalities	to	seep	in	where	the	influence	of	power	relations	and	
culture	can	lead	to	new	forms	of	predation	or	allow	governance	compromises	to	
emerge.	This	chapter	explores	cracks	in	the	modernization	process	at	the	national	and	
local	levels	of	the	Pakistani	electrical	power	sector,	with	each	level	conceptualized	as	a	
field	of	strategic	action.	The	major	argument	of	this	chapter	is	to	recognize	the	
importance	of	emergent	compromises	for	producing	workable	accommodations	of	
competing	interests,	improving	access	to	services,	and	addressing	questions	of	social	
justice.	Flexibility	in	responding	to	these	cracks	in	the	modernization	process	is	not	
always	a	failing,	but	can	be	a	desirable	–	and	possibly	necessary	–	accommodation.	
Dynamics	at	the	local	and	national	levels	are	not	exact	parallels	but	share	essential	
characteristics	in	the	way	governance	compromises	emerge.	
	
Keywords:	Governance;	formality;	electricity;	Pakistan		
	
Introduction	
Compromises	between	the	formalizing	imperatives	of	modernization	and	the	flexibility	
of	bureaucratic	agents	to	adapt	to	social	and	organizational	constraints	are	essential	to	
shaping	the	patterns	of	coordination	and	regulation	which	make	up	governance	in	the	
Pakistani	electrical	power	sector.	Discretion,	and	the	opportunity	for	idiosyncratic	
outcomes	it	entails,	is	unavoidable,	and	can	be	exercised	with	a	sense	of	social	
responsibility	or	narrowly	construed	personal	gain.	Governance	is	always	an	emergent	
compromise	produced	by	“the	complex	web	of	unfolding	transactions	and	processes”	in	
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which	bureaucratic	must	operate	(Silbey,	2011).	This	paper	will	argue	that	the	capacity	
of	individual	bureaucratic	agents	to	choose	amongst	multiple	courses	of	action	–	and	go	
beyond	their	formal	bounds	–	can	serve	the	organizational	mandate	of	public	good	
provision	better	than	the	pursuit	of	modernization	in	terms	of	increasing	formality.	
However,	the	task	of	preventing	this	autonomy	and	discretion	from	leading	to	the	abuse	
of	public	office	for	private	gain	depends	on	the	effectiveness	of	social	and	organizational		
constraints	on	bureaucratic	agents	which	may	fall	short	of	the	task.		
The	primary	shape	of	modernization	in	the	Pakistani	electrical	power	sector	is	a	
formalization	which	was	intended	to	promote	market	mechanisms.	As	in	other	
countries,	international	financial	institutions	pushed	a	standardized	template	of	reforms	
towards	increasing	competition	and	private	sector	participation,	with	poor	results	
(Williams	and	Dubash,	2004,	Williams	and	Ghanadan,	2006,	Woodhouse,	2006).	
Electricity	in	Pakistan	is	primarily	supplied	through	state-run	electrical	utilities	known	as	
distribution	companies.	In	principle,	electricity	connections,	ongoing	maintenance,	and	
payment	for	the	consumption	of	electricity	are	all	managed	according	to	the	
bureaucratic	rules	of	business.	However,	at	the	individual,	group,	and	national	levels,	
engagement	with	bureaucratic	rules	is	an	imprecise	process	in	which	the	codified	rules	
are	one	reference	amongst	many,	such	as	culture,	language,	rents	and	politics.	
This	paper	approaches	the	modernization	of	the	Pakistani	electrical	power	sector	using	
the	framework	of	strategic	action	fields	(Fligstein	and	McAdam,	2012).	Strategic	action	
fields	are	socially	constructed	arenas	with	which	actors	with	varying	resource	
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endowments	vie	for	advantage.	Actors	in	a	field	share	an	understanding	of	what	is	at	
stake,	how	the	positions	of	different	actors	are	related	(i.e.	their	relative	power),	and	
understand	the	rules	of	the	game	which	permit	certain	actions	to	certain	actors.	
However,	different	interpretive	frames	reflect	the	relative	positions	of	actors	who	have	
varying	capacities	(social	skill)	to	advance	or	ensure	the	claims	to	legitimacy	of	their	
preferred	frames	and	thus	serve	their	own	interests.	Within	this	broad	theoretical	
approach,	states	are	a	dense	network	of	fields.	The	local	and	national	levels	of	the	
Pakistani	electrical	power	sector	are	nested	like	Russian	dolls.	Each	has	its	own	players	
and	dynamics,	but	the	local	field	is	dependent	on	the	national	field	in	that	crucial	
decisions	of	policy	–	such	as	direction	of	governance	reforms	–	are	decided	at	the	
national	level	and	implemented	at	both	levels.	Governance	unfolds	on	multiple	levels	
simultaneously,	but	with	differing	patterns	of	coordination	and	regulation	at	each	level.		
In	the	sections	which	follow,	I	first	lay	out	the	reform	paradigm	based	on	formal	
institutions.	I	then	examine	the	reality	of	governance	at	the	offices	of	the	utility	
company	conducting	its	routine	operations,	for	a	squatter	settlement	seeking	to	
formalize	its	claim	on	service	delivery,	and	at	the	national	level	where	internationally	led	
initiatives	to	reform	the	power	sector	have	been	introduced.	The	empirical	sections	of	
this	paper	are	based	on	ethnographic	fieldwork	conducted	in	Islamabad,	Pakistan	over	
18	months	between	2008-2010.	I	have	a	near-native	level	of	fluency	in	Urdu	and	did	not	
use	a	translator.	During	my	fieldwork	I	interviewed	the	staff	of	the	electrical	utility	and	
their	customers,	as	well	as	observed	the	interactions	at	the	utility’s	local	offices.	I	
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subsequently	worked	for	an	international	development	agency	providing	assistance	to	
the	Ministry	of	Water	and	Power	on	energy	policy.		
Governance	and	Formal	Rules		
Two	divergent	treatments	of	the	relationship	between	formal	rules	and	governance	are	
found	in	distinct	streams	of	academic	literature.	In	the	literature	which	uses	detailed	
studies	of	governance	practices	as	its	empirical	source	material,	professional	discretion	
is	an	unavoidable	necessity	in	tension	with	broader	policy	imperatives.	Administrators,	
political	leaders,	and	citizens	(or	civil	society)	interact	to	produce	sustained	patterns	of	
governance	which	are	specific	to	their	local	context.	In	literature	based	on	cross-
national	datasets	as	its	empirical	basis,	governance	is	crucial	to	development	outcomes	
and	is	driven	chiefly	by	formal	institutions.	This	latter	approach	has	been	particularly	
prominent	in	development	thinking,	but	with	poor	results.	
Governance	reforms	that	concentrated	on	formal	rules	and	excluded	the	informal	
realities	of	country	context	have	been	a	failure.	OECD	development	aid	targeting	
governance	as	a	set	of	formal	rules	has	had	“limited	impact”	despite	spending	in	excess	
of	$10	billion	per	year	(Institute	of	Development	Studies,	2010).	The	message	that	
governance	reform	requires	attention	to	more	than	the	formal	rules	of	governance	is	
now	well	entrenched	in	development	thinking.	However,	the	dominant	theorization	of	
governance	for	development	is	drawn	from	new	institutionalist	economics,	which	
largely	restricts	itself	to	formal	rules.	The	seminal	statement	of	new	institutionalism	in	
economics	is	Douglass	North’s	(1990)	formulation	that	“Institutions	are	the	rules	of	the	
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game	in	a	society	or,	more	formally,	are	the	humanly	devised	constraints	that	shape	
human	interaction.”	These	rules	can	be	formal	–	codified	by	human	beings	–	or	informal	
“such	as	conventions	and	codes	of	behavior”.	That	the	institutionalist	framework	
includes	informal	rules	is	a	major	step	beyond	neo-classical	economics,	in	which	
treatment	of	the	Global	South	relied	on	“social	arrangements	that	economists	usually	
take	for	granted,	but	which	are	conspicuous	by	their	absence	in	poor	countries”	(Rodrik,	
2007).	Northian	informal	institutions	are	conceptually	cluttered	in	that	they	contain	
everything	from	panchayats	(village	councils)	in	South	Asia	to	the	Protestant	Ethic.		
A	recent	thread	in	comparative	politics	has	been	to	start	to	explore	the	interaction	of	
informal	and	formal	institutions	based	on	a	typology	developed	by	(Helmke	and	
Levitsky,	2006).	Helmke	and	Levitsky	posit	that	the	interaction	can	be	complementary,	
accommodating,	competing,	or	substitutive,	depending	on	the	effectiveness	of	the	
formal	institution	and	whether	the	formal	and	informal	institutions	diverge	or	converge.	
However,	the	epilogue	to	the	Helmke	and	Levitsky	volume	offers	the	alternative	view	
that	formal	institutions	“may	have	been	plunged	into	a	deep	sea	of	preexisting	informal	
rules	and	institutions”	(O'Donnell,	2006).	There	is	no	reason	to	give	precedence	to	
codified	rules	over	the	informal,	even	though	that	is	frequently	the	case.	
Recent	state-of-the-art	papers	in	the	Annual	Review	of	Political	Science	have	similar	
tendencies	to	the	literature	in	economics.	Mares	and	Carnes	(2009)	present	health	
policy	in	developing	countries	in	terms	of	their	formal	rules	and	Levitsky	and	Murillo	
(2009)	explore	variation	in	the	strength	of	political	institutions	through	the	enforcement	
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and	stability	of	constitutional	and	other	legal	structures.	None	of	the	twenty-two	
chapters	of	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Comparative	Institutional	Analysis	(Morgan,	2010)	
look	at	informal	rather	than	formal	institutions.	North	himself	wrote	that	“while	formal	
rules	can	help	in	creating	[institutional	frameworks	conducive	to	economic	growth],	it	is	
the	informal	constraints	embodied	in	norms	of	behavior,	conventions,	and	internally	
imposed	codes	of	conduct	that	are	critical”	(North,	1998).			
The	challenge	of	producing	good	outcomes	through	interventions	such	as	formal	rules	is	
at	the	heart	of	the	literature	on	regulation	and	governance.	The	principle	that	formal	
rules	do	not	pass	unscathed	through	the	organization	that	must	implement	them	is	well-
established	(Wilson,	1989).	Moreover,	going	by	the	book	and	not	showing	flexibility	in	
the	application	of	rules	gives	rise	to	the	problem	of	“regulatory	unreasonableness”	
(Bardach	and	Kagan,	1982).	Nonetheless,	many	organizations	offer	routinized	solutions,	
particularly	as	under-resourced	street	level	bureaucrats	must	manage	an	unworkable	
caseload	(Lipsky,	2010[1980]).	Discretion,	wherein	the	public	officer	must	choose	
amongst	possible	actions	(Davis,	1969),	is	unavoidable	in	these	circumstances.		
A	new	direction	in	studies	of	regulation	and	governance	places	discretion	at	the	heart	of	
the	possibility	of	“rewarding	regulation”	when	exercised	judiciously	by	a	“sociological	
citizen”	(Schrank,	2013,	Silbey,	2011).	Regulators	can	exercise	their	discretion	produce	
insightful	and	tailored	interventions	which	serve	their	organizational	mandate	under	
challenging	circumstances,	but	uncontrolled	discretion	can	also	lead	to	idiosyncratic	
decisions	and	the	abuse	of	public	position	for	private	gain.	These	authors	identify	limits	
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to	discretion	which	are	social	and	organizational	in	origin,	and	thus	probabilistic	and	
pragmatic	rather	than	absolute	(Feldman,	1992).	As	the	“identity	and	self-conception”	
of	the	agents	implementing	policy	at	the	street-level	becomes	“entwined	with	their	
organizational	roles,”	the	pathway	to	improved	organizational	performance	lies	in	
managing	organizational	culture	rather	than	the	direct	management	of	the	agents	
(Piore,	2011).	
The	three	vignettes	that	follow	illustrate	formal	rules	in	action	in	the	Pakistani	electrical	
power	sector.	They	show	the	interdependence	of	the	formal	and	the	informal,	and	how	
the	patterning	of	governance	is	produced	through	their	interaction.	Additionally,	they	
show	how	increasing	levels	of	formality	can	sometimes	produce	undesirable	outcomes.	
In	each	of	these	cases,	discretion	on	the	part	of	the	bureaucratic	agent	is	a	key	part	of	
shaping	the	patterns	of	governance,	and	the	degree	to	which	this	discretion	can	be	
tamed	to	serve	the	organizational	mandate	is	linked	to	the	influence	of	social	and	
organizational	limits	on	discretion.	 	
At	the	Offices	of	the	Islamabad	Electric	Supply	Company	
This	first	vignette	of	interactions	at	the	offices	of	the	Islamabad	electrical	utility	shows	
the	unavoidable	role	of	individual	bureaucratic	agents	in	the	passage	of	formal	rules	into	
concrete	actions.	Personal	contact	is	a	necessary	step	in	dealing	with	Islamabad	Electric	
Supply	Company	(IESCO)	and,	consequently,	dealing	with	personal	requests	is	a	major	
component	of	what	IESCO	employees	do	in	a	day.	These	demands	do	not	relent	even	
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when	they	are	otherwise	engaged,	such	as	in	one	field	visit	with	Omar	Sahib,	an	
Executive	Engineer	(XEN):		
Throughout	this	time	there	have	been	a	steady	stream	of	IESCO	employees	and	
consumers	bringing	in	papers	to	sign,	particularly	bills	which	need	to	be	adjusted	
or	addressed	in	some	way.	One	example.	A	youngish	fellow	in	jeans,	collared	t-
shirt,	with	shiny	black	shoes	(cheap	and	flashy)	asks	to	pay	in	installments.	He	
brings	in	the	bill,	Omar	Sahib	signs	it,	and	he	says	“most	kind”	(in	English).	At	
least	20	such	people	come	in	during	the	2	½	hours	I’m	there,	at	least	30	phone	
calls	too.	Omar	Sahib	has	two	mobile	phones.1		
Complaints	regarding	the	size	of	a	bill	are	frequently	put	to	IESCO	employees.	In	his	
capacity	as	XEN	Omar	Sahib	is	able	to	permit	a	bill	to	be	paid	in	installments,	though	this	
request	must	be	made	in	person	as	the	XEN’s	signature	is	required	on	the	actual	bill.	
Almost	every	such	request	is	granted,	so	long	as	the	customer	has	a	reasonable	record	
of	making	timely	payments.	Omar	Sahib	tells	me	that	it	serves	IESCO	to	allow	payment	
in	installments	because	at	least	some	payment	will	be	made	on	time	and	there	is	more	
chance	of	the	entire	bill	being	paid	in	course.	Allowing	a	bill	to	be	paid	in	installments	
also	pleases	the	consumer	and	is	far	less	effort	than	denying	it	as	a	consumer	will	
typically	protest	and	argue	with	the	IESCO	employee	if	rebuffed.		
Omar	Sahib’s	role	in	allowing	consumers	to	pay	in	installments	personalizes	
bureaucratic	operations.	Requests	are	made	in	person,	verbally,	at	his	desk.	IESCO	
consumers	can’t	avoid	encountering	him	and	making	a	polite	request	if	they	wish	to	pay	
in	installments.	Similarly,	getting	a	new	connection	involves	dealing	with	Babur	–	the	
Line	Superintendent	in	charge	of	new	connections	–	in	person.	Aside	from	the	need	to	
                                                
1	Field	notes	September	8,	2008.	
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follow	up	with	an	application	to	ensure	that	it	is	being	addressed,	people	have	to	deal	
personally	with	Babur	because	they	don’t	know	the	requirements	of	the	new	
connections	process.	While	documentation	is	available	and	given	out	on	request	–	such	
as	the	“Abriged	[sic]	Terms	and	Conditions”	for	a	new	connection	–	it	deters	and	
confuses,	rather	than	informs,	the	average	applicant.		
Babur	gives	me	a	copy	of	the	“Abriged”	[sic]	Terms	and	Conditions.	They’re	4	
pages	of	single	spaced,	dense	prose	[in	English].	I	ask	if	he’s	read	them.	Babur	
shakes	his	head,	laughs,	and	says	no.	Babur:	“Zubair	Sahib	[a	clerk	in	the	same	
office],	have	you	read	them?”	Zubair	shakes	his	head.	He	doesn’t	even	look	up	
from	his	files.	Babur	laughs	again:	‘How	many	years’	service	and	even	he	hasn’t	
read	them	...	when	you	read	them,	let	us	know	what	they	say!’		
The	formal	rules	governing	new	applications	are	literally	in	a	foreign	language	to	
Pakistanis.	While	many	Pakistanis	do	read	English,	their	facility	with	it	is	far	less	than	
with	Urdu.	Nonetheless,	the	written	language	of	the	Pakistani	government	is	usually	
English.	
The	necessity	of	personal	contact	is	the	first	plank	towards	the	mutually	constitutive	
role	of	codified	rules	and	informal	norms	in	establishing	the	institutional	field	of	
governance.	Unsurprisingly,	IESCO	employees	will	help	customers	out	for	a	small	fee	
(sometimes	called	“speed	money”	or	described	as	money	for	petrol	or	bus	fare).	Qasim	
is	an	IESCO	employee	in	the	disconnection	and	reconnection	department	of	a	sub-
divisional	office	which	serves	several	unfashionable	neighborhoods	of	Islamabad.		
While	I	am	in	his	office,	Qasim	receives	a	phone	call.	He	tells	the	caller	that	he’s	
in	his	office,	to	come	upstairs.	A	young	man	comes	in,	they	chat	briefly,	and	he	
gives	Qasim	a	bill	along	with	about	Rs	2000.	After	he	leaves,	Qasim	turns	to	me	
to	explain	that	guy	is	a	“jan-nay	wallah”	[‘someone	he	knows’]	and	their	meter	
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has	been	disconnected	for	a	while.	He’s	going	to	get	their	RCO	[re-connection	
order]	for	them.	He	goes	on	to	explain	that	‘to	get	an	RCO	is	complicated.’	For	
older	people	and	ladies	-	or	the	people	one	knows	-	he	or	other	IESCO	staff	will	
help	them	out.	And	they’ll	get	a	small	Rs	100-200	payment	for	this.	He	says,	“Is	
may	kuch	illegal	nahin	hai.”	‘There’s	nothing	illegal	in	this.’	Qasim	looks	at	me	as	
he	says	this,	but	his	eyes	meet	mine	only	briefly	and	then	flick	downwards.	
Qasim	starts	explaining	the	RCO	procedure	and	I	make	him	repeat	it	so	that	I	can	
write	all	the	steps	down.2	
The	procedure	to	reconnect	a	disconnected	meter	is	a	good	example	of	a	codified	rule	
controlling	service	delivery,	but	this	example	also	demonstrates	how	such	codified	rules	
are	filtered	through	social	norms	and	expectations	in	truly	becoming	the	rules	of	the	
game.	Qasim	is	in	effect	a	gatekeeper	because	those	codified	rules	are	generally	
unknown.	I	never	saw	anyone	ask	for	them	at	the	sub-division	office	during	my	
fieldwork.	The	terms	of	a	reconnection	are	included	in	the	2010	Customer	Service	
Manual	available	on	the	IESCO	website,3	but	this	laudable	step	towards	transparency	
wasn’t	in	place	at	the	time	of	my	fieldwork	and	will	not	(on	its	own)	serve	the	88%	of	
Pakistanis	without	internet	access	or	those	unaware	that	a	handbook	exists.	At	a	
minimum,	a	consumer	seeking	a	reconnection	will	have	to	approach	Qasim	in	person	at	
least	once	in	order	to	simply	learn	the	procedure.	The	tediousness	of	the	procedure	–
trips	to	different	locations	to	secure	receipts	and	approvals	–	also	represent	a	significant	
transaction	cost.	Weighing	up	a	tedious	and	unknown	procedure	it	is	little	wonder	that	
many	consumers	will	gladly	pay	a	small	amount	to	Qasim	to	process	their	paperwork.	
                                                
2	Field	notes,	February	24,	2009.	
3	Available	at	http://www.iesco.com.pk/downloads/Consumer%20Service%20Manual-2010.pdf		
Downloaded	on	May	2nd	2011.		
I	cannot	verify	when	the	Customer	Service	Manual	2010	was	posted,	but	the	document’s	
properties	indicate	that	it	was	created	on	May	12th	2010.	No	earlier	version	of	this	document	
was	posted	online.		
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The	written	procedure	will	be	followed	in	the	end,	but	only	when	mediated	by	an	officer	
who	gains	a	rent	due	to	their	exclusive	knowledge.	The	rules	of	the	game	are	social	
because	they	must	be	accessed	through	a	gatekeeper	and	oriented	towards	rents	both	
because	of	the	gatekeeper’s	role	and	the	tedious	nature	of	the	tasks.		
The	everyday	experience	of	securing	service	delivery	reveals	how	the	cultural	norms	and	
expectations	of	behavior	in	state	service	delivery	leave	little	room	for	the	operation	of	
formal	rules	–	rules	which	it	is	neither	possible	nor	desirable	to	observe.	My	interviews	
and	fieldwork	show	how	the	rules	of	game	in	service	delivery	are	shaped	by	language,	
power,	rents,	and	violence	as	much	as	they	are	by	codified	rules.	Neither	the	rulebook	
nor	social	reality	on	their	own	define	the	rules	of	the	game,	which	are	instead	mutually	
constituted	by	the	interaction	of	the	two.	
	A	focus	on	changing	written	rules	is	well	suited	to	a	technocratic	mindset	and	a	top-
down	administration.	Yet	in	Pakistan,	as	in	many	developing	countries,	an	important	
cause	of	poor	service	delivery	is	the	ineffectiveness	of	internal	administrative	
mechanisms.	Bureaucratic	commands	are	simply	not	fulfilled,	though	the	paperwork	
may	suggest	compliance.	Because	behavior	in	public	service	is	not	effectively	governed	
by	the	formal	rules,	changes	in	those	rules	are	unlikely	to	bring	about	the	desired	
changes	in	behavior.		
The	patterning	of	regulation	and	coordination	for	the	mundane	tasks	described	in	this	
vignette	is	heavily	shaped	by	personal	interactions.	Thus	there	are	substantial	social	and	
organizational	constraints	on	the	discretion	of	bureaucratic	agents.	While	the	
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bureaucratic	agents	are	the	key	actors	in	moving	from	formal	rules	to	concrete	action,	
and	they	will	do	so	in	a	manner	guided	by	their	organizational	mandate,	there	is	ample	
opportunity	to	apply	power	and	leverage	for	decision-making	which	can	either	produce	
a	steady	stream	of	payments	or	conform	to	the	needs	of	influential	clients	(or	both).		
In	an	Islamabad	Squatter	Settlement	
This	second	vignette	illustrates	a	different	type	of	compromise	in	which	the	patterns	of	
governance	that	emerge	deviate	from	the	formal	rules,	but	in	doing	so	enable	the	
electricity	supply	to	a	marginalized	community.	Increasing	formality	in	this	setting	is	
problematic	because	it	changes	the	bargaining	position	of	the	claimants	from	a	large	
group	to	the	individual.	
Liaqat,	one	of	my	key	informants	in	the	44	Quarter	katchi	abadi	(squatter	settlement),	
tells	me	that	IESCO	employees	are	complicit	in	theft	of	electricity	through	illegal	
connections	serving	katchi	abadis.4	Liaqat	tells	me	that	“The	same	money,	instead	of	
going	to	WAPDA’s	treasury	went	to	police	and	WAPDA	staff.”5	44	Quarter’s	proximity	to	
middle	class	residential	and	commercial	areas	is	a	crucial	advantage	in	terms	of	
proximity	to	jobs,	and	it	also	means	that	the	same	electrical	infrastructure	to	serve	their	
bourgeois	neighbors	could	easily	serve	them.	However,	as	easy	as	illicit	electricity	
connections	are	to	enable,	they	are	also	easy	to	spot.	For	most	of	44	Quarter’s	history,	
                                                
4	Liaqat	is	a	pseudonym,	as	is	44	Quarter.		
5	Field	notes	March	19,	2010.	WAPDA,	the	Water	and	Power	Development	Authority,	is	the	
name	of	the	vertically	integrated	utility	from	which	IESCO	was	carved	out.	Many	Pakistanis	still	
refer	to	any	and	all	organizations	dealing	with	electrical	power	as	WAPDA.	
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the	police	and	employees	of	WAPDA	took	money	from	residents	in	exchange	for	not	
ending	this	practice.	
The	cooperation	from	police	and	WAPDA	employees	ended	in	1998	when	the	army	was	
invited	to	help	manage	WAPDA	by	the	then	(and	current)	Prime	Minister	Nawaz	Sharif.	
Army	personnel	were	assigned	to	oversee	WAPDA	officials	with	a	particular	view	
towards	reducing	electricity	theft.		
The	44	Quarter	residents	formed	a	committee	to	get	their	electricity	reconnected.	They	
approach	the	army	brigadier	in	charge	of	IESCO	and	appealed	on	the	basis	that	they	
were	forced	to	steal	electricity	because	they	were	denied	the	legal	connections	that	
would	allow	them	to	pay	for	it.	Liaqat	says	that	“It’s	our	right	[to	electricity].	If	you	won’t	
give	it	to	us,	then	we’ll	take	it	like	this.”	(“Hamara	right	bunta	hai.	To	aap	nahin	dain	
gain,	to	hum	is	taran	lain	gain.”)6 	
The	44	Quarter	residents	accepted	a	compromise	that	a	communal	meter	be	installed.	
This	was	a	legal	connection,	but	the	residents	would	have	to	arrange	the	wiring	of	all	
their	houses	to	this	single	connection	point	and	handle	any	internal	arrangements	for	
allocating	charges	among	the	residents	themselves.		
A	few	families	in	44	Quarter	successfully	obtained	individual	electricity	meters	before	
IESCO	accepted	that	more	generally	for	all	the	residents.	Adam’s	family	was	initially	
pleased	with	the	installation	of	their	personal	meter	because	of	the	subsidized	rates.	
However,	the	family	shortly	received	a	bill	showing	electricity	consumption	some	100	
                                                
6	Field	notes	March	19	2010	
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times	what	could	reasonably	expected	from	their	household.	Adam	is	a	reasonably	
confident	young	man	who	expresses	himself	to	me	clearly,	but	his	attempts	to	negotiate	
at	the	local	IESCO	office	were	unsuccessful.	He	blames	this	failure	on	being	insufficiently	
educated	(‘purray	likhay’).	The	opacity	of	the	WAPDA	process	and	the	cold	treatment	
from	the	staff	deterred	him,	and	they	are	resigned	to	paying	their	excessive	bill.	Adam’s	
family	returned	to	the	communal	system	as	a	result	of	their	bad	experience	with	the	
formal	system.		
To	formalize	relations	with	the	state	is	less	of	a	destination	than	a	new	negotiating	point	
from	which	to	tackle	the	ever-shifting	challenges	of	urban	poverty.	Unlike	44	Quarter,	
some	Islamabad	katchi	abadis	have	completed	the	regularization	process.	The	families	
which	had	to	move	when	the	area	was	rezoned	were	compensated	with	plots	in	F-10,	a	
relatively	well-off	area.	After	taking	possession	of	the	land,	however,	those	families	sold	
the	land	and	moved	to	new	katchi	abadis	(Rasool,	2010).	Matthew	Hull	(Hull,	2012)	
describes	how	villagers	on	Islamabad’s	periphery	make	serial	moves	into	areas	where	
the	city	will	expand	next	in	anticipation	of	compensation	from	authorities	for	their	
dislocation.	These	villagers	seek	formal	recognition	by	getting	their	name	on	a	list	which	
identifies	those	who	will	be	compensated.	In	both	cases,	formality	has	an	instrumental	
utility	unrelated	to	the	actual	occupation	of	the	land	in	question.		
The	residents	of	the	katchi	abadis	are	savvy	navigators	of	the	tension	between	formal	
rules	and	their	capacity	to	effectively	claim	service	delivery.	Securing	individual	rights	
isn’t	necessarily	the	most	advantageous	position	because	it	involves	a	transition	from	
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negotiating	with	bureaucratic	agents	as	a	group	to	negotiating	as	individuals.	Trying	to	
take	advantage	of	those	individual	rights	can	be	a	losing	proposition,	as	squatters	aren’t	
always	well	placed	to	follow	de	Soto’s	path	to	prosperity	through	leveraging	property	
values	(de	Soto,	2000,	Gravois,	2005).	The	land	title	itself	is	just	one	component	of	the	
struggle	for	voice	and	recognition	by	the	landless	poor	(Hetherington,	2011).	
Policymaking	and	Structural	Change	at	the	National	level	
The	previous	two	examples	illustrate	the	emergence	of	compromises	between	the	
formal	and	informal	which	still	serve	the	public	in	some	oblique,	imperfect	way;	
individuals’	cash	flow	problems	are	accommodated	and	squatters	get	electricity	
provision.	The	compromises	are	shaped	by	social	interactions	among	street	level	
bureaucrats	and	the	people	they	serve.	This	last	vignette	is	at	the	national	level	rather	
than	the	street	level,	and	illustrates	how	the	idiosyncratic	filtering	of	the	formal	through	
the	social	realities	of	how	state	power	is	exercised	can	be	abused	for	personal	interest.	
This	case	isn’t	included	to	produce	surprise	that	public	office	is	sometimes	abused,	and	
other	examples	could	have	shown	more	constructive	compromises	(e.g.	amongst	
provincial	representatives	at	the	Council	of	Common	Interests)	in	line	with	the	previous	
two	examples.	In	contrast,	this	case	shows	how	hard	it	can	be	to	prevent	this	abuse	
even	when	the	perpetrators	are	caught	in	the	act	by	the	media	and	elected	
representatives.		
Power	sector	reform	initiatives	have	introduced	several	major	structural	changes	in	an	
attempt	to	change	the	processes	and	outcomes	of	the	power	sector.	These	initiatives	
 
 
 
Conditionally accepted at Current Sociology 
 16 
have	typically	been	backed	by	international	donors	and	multilateral	lenders,	with	–	at	
best	–	mixed	success.	In	this	section	I	will	examine	the	National	Electric	Power	
Regulatory	Authority	(NEPRA)	established	in	1997.	
NEPRA,	like	any	regulatory	authority,	can	only	fulfill	its	role	with	the	right	staff	with	
relevant	expertise.	The	NEPRA	Act	of	19977	states	that	the	chairman	“shall	be	an	
eminent	professional	of	known	integrity	and	competence	with	at	least	twenty	years	of	
related	experience	in	law,	business,	engineering,	finance,	accounting,	economics,	or	the	
electric	utility	business.”	To	recruit	such	a	person	when	the	post	was	last	vacated	in	
September	2007,	NEPRA	placed	an	advertisement	in	Pakistani	newspapers	for	which	it	
received	72	applications	to	the	post	of	chairman	by	October	20	2007.	8	A	shortlist	of	17	
applicants	was	interviewed	by	a	committee	headed	by	the	secretary	of	the	Cabinet	
division,	and	the	committee	sent	its	recommendation	to	caretaker	Prime	Minister	
Soomro9	for	approval	on	January	18	2008.	The	committee’s	recommendations	were	
returned	without	decision	on	February	14th.	The	next	day	–	three	days	before	
parliamentary	elections	which	would	lead	to	a	new	Prime	Minister	being	installed	–	the	
caretaker	Prime	Minister	appointed	his	Principal	Secretary	Khalid	Saeed	to	the	post	of	
NEPRA	Chairman,	but	also	had	him	retain	his	then	post	of	Principal	Secretary	to	the	
Prime	Minister.	Saeed	had	not	applied	for	the	position	of	NEPRA	Chairman	and	does	not	
                                                
7	An	Act	to	provide	for	the	regulation	of	generation,	transmission	and	distribution	of	electric	
power.	The	Gazette	of	Pakistan,	Extraordinary.	December	16	1997.		
8	“Khalid	Saeed	retained	as	NEPRA	Chairman,”	Aaj	News,	January	7	2009	
Available	at:	http://www.aaj.tv/2009/01/khalid-saeed-retained-as-nepra-chairman/		
9	Parliament	had	been	dissolved	prior	to	the	2008	elections	originally	scheduled	for	January	8	
2008,	but	delayed	to	February	18	2008	due	to	the	assassination	of	Benazir	Bhutto.		
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have	the	required	20	years	of	related	experience.	On	February	26th		2008,	the	Pakistan	
Senate	passed	a	near-unanimous	resolution	against	Saeed’s	appointment,	noting	his	
lack	of	qualifications,	occupation	of	two	government	posts	simultaneously	(which	is	
unconstitutional),	and	describing	the	process	as	“against	accepted	norms.”10	Saeed	
resigned	from	his	post	as	Principal	Secretary	to	the	Prime	Minister	some	four	hours	
before	the	senate	resolution	against	him	was	moved,	but	retained	his	new	post	as	
NEPRA	Chairman.11	Despite	the	senate	resolution,	a	petition	before	the	Lahore	High	
Court	challenging	his	appointment,12	and	the	fact	that	he	was	near	retirement	age,	
Khalid	Saeed	stayed	in	his	post	as	Chairman	NEPRA.	Moreover,	an	amendment	to	the	
NEPRA	act	on	August	12	2011	added	“and	public	administration”	to	the	list	of	fields	in	
which	NEPRA	chairmen	can	have	had	their	requisite	20	years	of	experience.	Not	only	
was	the	appointment	process	circumvented	to	appoint	an	unqualified	candidate	in	
2008,	but	now	administrators	with	no	relevant	experience	can	legally	head	NEPRA.	The	
post	of	NEPRA	chairman	is	now	primed	as	a	ripe	cherry	for	retiring	bureaucrats	wanting	
to	stay	on	the	government	payroll	after	retirement.	The	lesson	is	not	just	that	the	newly	
formed	regulatory	agency	was	subverted	by	existing	power	structures,	but	also	that	
media	attention,	a	senate	resolution,	and	continued	involvement	by	international	
donors	in	electricity	reform	could	not	stop	it	from	happening.	
                                                
10	“Senate	resolve	against	appointment	of	Khalid	Saeed	as	Chairman	NEPRA,”	Associated	Press	
of	Pakistan,	February	26	2008.	
	Available	at:	http://app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29955		
11“PS	to	Soomro	quits	as	Senate	passes	resolution,”	The	News,	February	27	2008.		
12	“Appointment	of	Nepra	chief	challenged	in	LHC,”	OnePakistan	News,	11	February	2010	
Available	at:	http://www.onepakistan.com/news/national/32834-Appointment-Nepra-chief-
challenged-LHC.html	
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Pakistan	is	a	fractious	federation.	Power	sector	policy	can	either	reinforce	the	stresses	
between	the	provinces	or	diffuse	them.	Each	province	has	its	own	profile	of	generation	
and	distribution,	and	the	there	is	a	rough	symmetry	in	that	the	fuel	producing	provinces	
have	poorer	performance	at	the	distribution	level.	Disaggregated	pricing	for	distribution	
and	generation	will	damage	the	sector	as	a	whole	and	be	politically	toxic.	One	way	in	
which	the	balance	between	the	different	provincial	profiles	for	generation	and	
distribution	is	recognized	is	through	the	uniform	national	tariff,	i.e.	the	principle	that	all	
Pakistani	electricity	consumers	are	charged	the	same	rate	anywhere	in	the	country.	This	
idea	is	an	anathema	to	neoliberal	reformers	who	insist	on	local	cost	recovery	and	the	
operation	of	each	distribution	company	as	a	commercially	viable	entity	in	anticipation	of	
privatization.		
The	uniform	national	tariff	serves	an	important	function	in	maintaining	the	harmony	of	
the	Pakistani	federation.	While	the	best	performers	among	distribution	companies	are	
in	Punjab,	the	cheapest	generation	options	come	from	sources	in	Khyber	Pukhtunkhwa,	
Sindh	and	Balochistan.	Investment	in	hydro-electric	power	is	largely	done	by	the	federal	
government,	and	each	province	(mostly	Khyber	Pukhtunkhwa)	gets	profit	shares	for	the	
hydro-electric	generation.	However,	Khyber	Pukhtunkhwa	has	not	been	paid	royalties	in	
a	timely	fashion	in	the	past,	and	they	may	still	feel	ownership	over	the	hydro	projects	
located	in	Khyber	Pukhtunkhwa.	Just	as	the	benefits	of	preferred	fuels	are	shared	
through	the	common	generation	pool,	the	uniform	national	tariff	shares	the	strengths	
and	challenges	of	the	different	distribution	company’s	territories	across	the	federation.	
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Power	was	moved	from	the	concurrent	list	to	the	federal	list	in	the	18th	amendment,	
suggesting	that	a	federal	perspective	is	appropriate.	
Arguments	for	approaching	electricity	as	a	provincial	issue	have	some	merit,	but	come	
with	substantial	risks.	The	benefit	is	that	ownership	of	the	major	distribution	problem	–	
preventing	theft	and	collecting	payments	–	would	be	in	the	hands	of	provincial	
politicians	with	the	deep	local	connections	to	address	these	issues.	However,	there	is	no	
guarantee	that	they	would	seek	to	do	so	rather	than	continue	with	some	variation	of	
the	status	quo	in	which	they	seek	jobs	for	their	constituents	and	rents	for	themselves	
over	reforms	that	give	a	long	term	benefit	to	the	whole	province.	Moreover,	a	
complicated	new	electricity	market	would	have	to	be	designed	to	adjust	for	the	
allocation	of	different	sources	of	power	generation.	Breaking	up	the	common	
generation	pool	would	mean	that	provinces	would	compete	to	have	the	cheapest	
energy	allocated	to	them.	Regardless	of	the	qualities	of	the	market	design	(no	doubt	
drawing	on	best	international	practices),	tremendous	pressures	would	be	put	on	the	
people	deciding	on	these	allocations	of	power	to	favor	one	province	or	distribution	
company.	The	private	sector	cannot	remove	institutional	weaknesses	by	magic,	and	“the	
process	of	involving	the	private	sector	has	itself	been	a	significant	source	of	rents”	
(Kenny,	2007).	Every	experience	of	such	structural	reforms	in	the	Pakistani	power	sector	
suggests	that	the	capacity	of	existing	power	structures	to	subvert	new	structural	
arrangements	exceeds	the	capacity	of	pro-reform	constituents	to	prevent	such	abuses.		
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Social	and	organizational	constraints	did	operate	in	the	case	of	the	NEPRA	chairmanship.	
It	is	difficult	to	imagine	what	more	could	be	done	in	such	a	case	than	to	have	the	senate	
take	notice	and	for	the	media	to	cover	it.	However,	social	and	organizational	constraints	
are	probabilistic	rather	than	absolute.	This	case	may	just	lend	support	to	the	view	that	
Pakistani	elite	bureaucrats	indulge	in	self-serving	practices	against	their	organizational	
mandate	(Niaz,	2010).	There	is	also	a	contrast	to	be	drawn	with	the	earlier	vignettes	
where	the	social	and	organizational	constraints	on	behavior	were	more	immediate	and	
personal	than	the	rarified	level	of	national	government.	Although	the	evidence	
presented	here	is	insufficient	to	conclude	the	argument,	these	vignettes	suggest	that	
the	capacity	of	social	and	organizational	constraints	to	limit	discretion	in	accordance	
with	the	organizational	mandate	is	dependent	on	the	immediacy	and	persistence	of	
those	constraints,	particularly	when	manifested	as	a	communal	or	moral	right	such	as	in	
the	case	of	the	katchi	abadi.			
Discussion	and	Conclusions	
The	dichotomization	of	formality	and	informality	is	an	incomplete	representation	of	the	
rules	of	the	game	for	governance	in	the	Pakistani	power	sector.	For	individuals	paying	a	
bill	in	installments	or	avoiding	a	disconnection,	they	have	to	work	through	the	street	
level	bureaucrats	through	whom	the	official	procedures	are	managed.	The	rules	of	the	
game	are	neither	formal	or	informal,	but	mutually	constituted	by	the	interaction	of	the	
formal	and	informal	through	social	processes.	As	social	processes,	the	construction	of	
the	rules	of	the	game	reflects	the	power	and	relative	position	of	the	actors	involved.		
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The	characterization	of	governance	as	a	strategic	action	field	brings	the	focus	to	a	
dynamic	and	emergent	consideration	of	how	formal	rules	shape	patters	of	governance.	
Modernization,	and	the	responses	to	it,	can	take	different	guises	and	produce	different	
responses	at	different	levels	of	analysis.	The	governance	compromises	at	the	national	
level	and	local	level	have	different	dynamics	and	outcomes,	but	in	both	fields	the	
modernizing	impulse	is	shaped	and	reformed	through	its	interaction	with	power	and	
politics.		
At	neither	the	local	nor	the	national	level	does	increasing	levels	of	formality	produce	
uniformly	desirable	outcomes:	the	squatters	who	secure	individual	meters	find	
themselves	vulnerable	to	new	forms	of	predation;	collective	negotiations	can	provide	
more	security	than	an	individual	contract;	auditors	can	use	their	position	to	extract	
rents;	and	seasoned	bureaucrats	can	outmaneuver	local	media	and	irate	politicians.	
Retreats	from	formality	take	place	at	both	local	and	individual	levels	as	exposure	to	
predation	and	relative	advantage	are	influenced	by	modernizing	impulses.	Whether	
these	discretionary	moves	are	constructive	in	serving	the	organizational	mandate	
towards	the	public	good	of	electricity	service	provision,	however,	is	hugely	shaped	by	
the	extent	to	which	social	and	organizational	constraints	weigh	on	the	bureaucratic	
agents	who	are	key	actors	in	these	processes	and	transactions.	
The	cracks	which	are	revealed	in	the	modernization	process	can	vary	from	constructive	
accommodations	to	local	power	realities	and	necessary	political	compromises	to	
opportunities	for	predation	by	local	notables.	It	isn’t	possible	to	conclude	that	these	
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adaptions	to	the	modernizing	impulse	are	always	openings	for	predation	by	local	
notables,	as	they	can	also	be	practical	adjustments	to	an	unwieldy	process	or	
accommodations	of	a	pressing	social	need.	The	patterns	of	coordination	and	regulation	
that	emerge	in	local	and	national	fields	of	electricity	sector	governance	are	always	the	
products	of	a	compromise	produced	by	the	interplay	of	actors	navigating	formal	rules,	
culture,	and	power.		
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